The Role of Social Structure in the Maintenance of Cooperative Regimes

by: Michael D Cohen, Rick L Riolo, Robert Axelrod

Rationality and Society, Vol. 13, No. 1. (1 February 2001), pp. 5-32.

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Abstract

We analyze the role of social structure in maintaining cooperation within a population of adaptive agents for whom cooperative behavior may be costly in the short run. We use the example of a collection of agents playing pairwise Prisoner's Dilemma. We call sustained cooperative behavior in such circumstances a `cooperative regime'. We show that social structure, by channeling which agents interact with which others, can sustain cooperative regimes against forces that frequently dissolve them. We show in detail the process through which structured interaction in a population creates a `shadow of the adaptive future', allowing even a small set of cooperative strategies to grow into a cooperative regime, a coherent, self-sustaining entity that is something more than the sum of the pairwise interactions among its members. 10.1177/104346301013001001

@article{citeulike:1243712, abstract = {We analyze the role of social structure in maintaining cooperation within a population of adaptive agents for whom cooperative behavior may be costly in the short run. We use the example of a collection of agents playing pairwise Prisoner's Dilemma. We call sustained cooperative behavior in such circumstances a `cooperative regime'. We show that social structure, by channeling which agents interact with which others, can sustain cooperative regimes against forces that frequently dissolve them. We show in detail the process through which structured interaction in a population creates a `shadow of the adaptive future', allowing even a small set of cooperative strategies to grow into a cooperative regime, a coherent, self-sustaining entity that is something more than the sum of the pairwise interactions among its members. 10.1177/104346301013001001}, author = {Cohen, Michael D. and Riolo, Rick L. and Axelrod, Robert }, citeulike-article-id = {1243712}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/104346301013001001}, journal = {Rationality and Society}, keywords = {\_d\_, \_d\_simulation-evidence, abm, cooperation}, month = {February}, number = {1}, pages = {5--32}, posted-at = {2007-04-22 16:47:08}, priority = {3}, title = {The Role of Social Structure in the Maintenance of Cooperative Regimes}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/104346301013001001}, volume = {13}, year = {2001} }

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TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:1243712 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1243712 TI - The Role of Social Structure in the Maintenance of Cooperative Regimes JF - Rationality and Society VL - 13 IS - 1 SP - 5 EP - 32 N2 - We analyze the role of social structure in maintaining cooperation within a population of adaptive agents for whom cooperative behavior may be costly in the short run. We use the example of a collection of agents playing pairwise Prisoner's Dilemma. We call sustained cooperative behavior in such circumstances a `cooperative regime'. We show that social structure, by channeling which agents interact with which others, can sustain cooperative regimes against forces that frequently dissolve them. We show in detail the process through which structured interaction in a population creates a `shadow of the adaptive future', allowing even a small set of cooperative strategies to grow into a cooperative regime, a coherent, self-sustaining entity that is something more than the sum of the pairwise interactions among its members. 10.1177/104346301013001001 KW - _d_ KW - _d_simulation-evidence KW - abm KW - cooperation AU - Cohen, Michael AU - Riolo, Rick AU - Axelrod, Robert PY - 2001/02/01/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/104346301013001001 ER -

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