The Evolution of Cooperation

by: Robert Axelrod, William D Hamilton

Science, Vol. 1981

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Abstract

Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficuilty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.

@article{citeulike:1243719, abstract = {Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficuilty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.}, author = {Axelrod, Robert and Hamilton, William D. }, citeulike-article-id = {1243719}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1685895}, journal = {Science}, keywords = {\_d\_, \_d\_simulation-evidence, abm, cooperation}, posted-at = {2007-04-22 16:55:03}, priority = {2}, title = {The Evolution of Cooperation}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1685895}, volume = {1981} }

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TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:1243719 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1243719 TI - The Evolution of Cooperation JF - Science VL - 1981 N2 - Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficuilty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease. KW - _d_ KW - _d_simulation-evidence KW - abm KW - cooperation AU - Axelrod, Robert AU - Hamilton, William UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1685895 ER -

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