CiteULike: Group: ACS - with tag bounded-rationality

Evidence accumulation in decision making: unifying the "take the best" and the "rational" models.

MD Lee — 2008-06-16T15:19:54-00:00

Psychonomic bulletin & review, Vol. 11, No. 2. (April 2004), pp. 343-352.

An evidence accumulation model of forced-choice decision making is proposed to unify the fast and frugal take the best (TTB) model and the alternative rational (RAT) model with which it is usually contrasted. The basic idea is to treat the TTB model as a sequential-sampling process that terminates as soon as any evidence in favor of a decision is found and the rational approach as a sequential-sampling process that terminates only when all available information has been assessed. The unified TTB and RAT models were tested in an experiment in which participants learned to make correct judgments for a set of real-world stimuli on the basis of feedback, and were then asked to make additional judgments without feedback for cases in which the TTB and the rational models made different predictions. The results show that, in both experiments, there was strong intraparticipant consistency in the use of either the TTB or the rational model but large interparticipant differences in which model was used. The unified model is shown to be able to capture the differences in decision making across participants in an interpretable way and is preferred by the minimum description length model selection criterion.

Re-visions of rationality?

BR Newell — 2006-03-10T16:12:06-00:00

Trends Cogn Sci, Vol. 9, No. 1. (January 2005), pp. 11-15.

The appeal of simple algorithms that take account of both the constraints of human cognitive capacity and the structure of environments has been an enduring theme in cognitive science. A novel version of such a boundedly rational perspective views the mind as containing an 'adaptive toolbox' of specialized cognitive heuristics suited to different problems. Although intuitively appealing, when this version was proposed, empirical evidence for the use of such heuristics was scant. I argue that in the light of empirical studies carried out since then, it is time this 'vision of rationality' was revised. An alternative view based on integrative models rather than collections of heuristics is proposed.

A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice

Herbert Simon — 2006-12-15T09:58:58-00:00

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 69, No. 1. (1955), pp. 99-118.

Introduction, 99.--I. Some general features of rational choice, 100.--II. The essential simplifications, 103.--III. Existence and uniqueness of solutions, 111.--IV. Further comments on dynamics, 113.--V. Conclusion, 114.--Appendix, 115.

Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics

Daniel Kahneman — 2006-11-22T18:27:58-00:00

The American Economic Review, Vol. 93, No. 5. (2003), pp. 1449-1475.