CiteULike: Ключевое слово false_positivefalse_negative

Some Public Policy Problems with the Science of Carcinogen Risk Assessment

Carl Cranor — 2007-02-15T09:36:51-00:00

Government agencies and private risk assessors use (quasi) scientific risk assessment procedures to try to estimate or predict risk to human health or the environment that might result from exposure to toxic substances in order to take steps to prevent such risks from arising or to eliminate the risks if they already exist. In this paper I discuss several ways in which the "science" of carcinogen risk assessment differs from ordinary scientific enterprises. I also consider several ways in which normative policy considerations infect this regulatory science. Scientists, philosophers of science, moral philosophers and policy makers should address these issues forthrightly in order to serve better the aims of science and regulation.

On the Seriousness of Mistakes

Isaac Levi — 2007-10-24T11:29:05-00:00

Philosophy of Science, Vol. 29, No. 1. (1962), pp. 47-65.

Several authors have recently contended that modern statistical theory provides a powerful argument in favor of the view that if scientists accept or reject hypotheses at all they do so only in a behavioral sense--i.e., in a sense which reduces "accepting P" to "acting on the basis of P relative to an objective O". In this paper, the argument from statistics in favor of a behavioral view is outlined; an interpretation of two statistical procedures (Bayes method and signifigance testing) is offered which does not entail a behavioral analysis of "accepting a hypothesis"; and the conclusion that non-behavioral analyses of belief are compatible with the application of current statistical theory in the sciences is tentatively advanced.

Prediction, Explanation, and Dioxin Biochemistry: Science in Public Policy

Heather Douglas — 2006-11-09T13:42:33-00:00

Foundations of Chemistry, Vol. V6, No. 1. (1 January 2004), pp. 49-63.

Late lessons from early warnings: towards precaution and realism in research and policy.

D Gee — 2007-03-25T15:48:34-00:00

Water Sci Technol, Vol. 52, No. 6. (2005), pp. 25-34.

This paper focuses on the evidentiary aspects of the precautionary principle. Three points are highlighted: (i) the difference between association and causation; (ii) how the strength of scientific evidence can be considered; and (iii) the reasons why regulatory regimes tend to err in the direction of false negatives rather than false positives. The point is made that because obtaining evidence of causation can take many decades of research, the precautionary principle can be invoked to justify action when evidence of causation is not available, but there is good scientific evidence of an association between exposures and impacts. It is argued that the appropriate level of proof is context dependent, as "appropriateness" is based on value judgements about the acceptability of the costs, about the distribution of the costs, and about the consequences of being wrong. A complementary approach to evaluating the strength of scientific evidence is to focus on the level of uncertainty. If decision makers are made aware of the limitations of the knowledge base, they can compensate by adopting measures aimed at providing early warnings of un-anticipated effects and mitigating their impacts. The point is made that it is often disregarded that the Bradford Hill criteria for evaluating evidence are asymmetrical, in that the applicability of a criterion increases the strength of evidence on the presence of an effect, but the inapplicability of a criterion does not increase the strength of evidence on the absence of an effect. The paper discusses the reason why there are so many examples of regulatory "false negatives" as opposed to "false positives". Two main reasons are put forward: (i) the methodological bias within the health and environmental sciences; and (ii) the dominance within decision-making of short term economic and political interests. Sixteen features of methods and culture in the environmental and health sciences are presented. Of these, only three features tend to generate "false positives". It is concluded that although the different features of scientific methods and culture produce robust science, they can lead to poor regulatory decisions on hazard prevention.

Violence risk prediction in practice

G Szmukler — 2006-12-11T14:31:29-00:00

Br J Psychiatry, Vol. 178, No. 1. (1 January 2001), pp. 84-85.

10.1192/bjp.178.1.84

True Warnings and False Alarms about Technology, 1948-1971 (RFF Press)

Allan Mazur — 2007-04-27T14:15:56-00:00

(31 July 2002)

Today, there is broad agreement that CFCs destroy stratospheric ozone. On the other hand, research does not support claims that electromagnetic fields from transmission lines cause a noticeable increase of leukemia. But new allegations arise. Are manufactured chemicals in the environment distorting hormonal processes in our bodies? Are genetically modified foods a cause for concern?Addressing one of the most vexing problems in risk policy, Allan Mazur asks how we can tell, at an early stage, how seriously we should take a new warning. To identify hallmarks that could help predict the truth or falsity of an alleged hazard, Mazur analyzes 31 health warnings raised during the 1950s and 60s about diverse technologies including fluoridation, DDT, cyclamate, nuclear weapons testing, and birth control pills. Among his considerations are the initial source of an alarm, the biases held by its "sponsors," and the type of media coverage it received. With 30 to 50 years of hindsight, he identifies characteristics -- apparent from the outset of a controversy -- that most effectively distinguish between true warnings from false alarms.Mazur's findings do not provide certainty about which of today's warnings will prove true and which will prove false. But they do help us to make informed judgments about where it is best and most reasonable to direct our worries and resources.

Risk assessment: 'numbers' and 'values'

George Szmukler — 2006-12-11T14:26:46-00:00

Psychiatr Bull, Vol. 27, No. 6. (1 June 2003), pp. 205-207.

10.1192/pb.27.6.205

Food supplements and European regulation within a precautionary context: a critique and implications for nutritional, toxicological and regulatory consistency.

JC Hanekamp — 2007-07-11T12:58:09-00:00

Crit Rev Food Sci Nutr, Vol. 47, No. 3. (2007), pp. 267-285.

In this paper, we review European legislation in the field of micronutrient food supplements and find it wanting. It is shown that the precautionary principle, embedded in European food legislation, pre-empts innovative developments in this field. In view of the scientific advances in micronutrients research, we subsequently critique the precautionary perspective and propose a novel outlook on micronutrients food supplements regulation. However, this requires a transition from the "survival" approach of the current deficiency-related RDAs to a "health-optimization" approach of a n(ew)-RDA. Genomic integrity is central in this envisioned transition.

Inductive Risk and Values in Science

Heather Douglas — 2006-11-09T18:45:56-00:00

Philosophy of Science, Vol. 67, No. 4. (2000), pp. 559-579.

Although epistemic values have become widely accepted as part of scientific reasoning, non-epistemic values have been largely relegated to the "external" parts of science (the selection of hypotheses, restrictions on methodologies, and the use of scientific technologies). I argue that because of inductive risk, or the risk of error, non-epistemic values are required in science wherever non-epistemic consequences of error should be considered. I use examples from dioxin studies to illustrate how non-epistemic consequences of error can and should be considered in the internal stages of science: choice of methodology, characterization of data, and interpretation of results.