Metaskepticism: Meditations in Ethno-Epistemology

@inbook{nichols03, abstract = {Throughout the 20th century , an enormous amount of intellectual fuel was spent debating the merits of a class of skeptical arguments which purport to show that knowledge of the external world is not possible. These arguments , whose origins can be traced back to Descartes , played an important role in the work of some of the leading philosophers of the 20th century , including Russell , Moore and Wittgenstein , and they continue to engage the interest of contemporary philosophers. (e.g. , Cohen 1999 , DeRose 1995 , Hill 1996 , Klein 1981 , Lewis 1996 , McGinn 1993 , Nozick 1981 , Schiffer 1996 , Unger 1975 , Williams 1996) Typically , these arguments make use of one or more premises which the philosophers proposing them take to be intuitively obvious. Beyond an appeal to intuition , little or no defense is offered , and in many cases it is hard to see what else could be said in support of these premises. A number of authors have suggested that the intuitions undergirding these skeptical arguments are universal \^{a}€“ shared by everyone (or almost everyone) who thinks reflectively about knowledge. In this paper we will offer some evidence indicating that they are far from universal. Rather , the evidence suggests that many of the intuitions epistemologists invoke vary with the cultural background , socio-economic status and educational background of the person offering the intuition. And this , we will argue , is bad news for the skeptical arguments that rely on those intuitions. The evidence may also be bad news for skepticism itself \^{a}€“ not because it shows that skepticism is false , but rather because , if we accept one prominent account of the link between epistemic intuitions and epistemic concepts , it indicates that skepticism may be much less interesting and much less worrisome than philosophers have taken it to be.}, author = {Nichols, Shaun and Stich, Stephen and Weinberg, Jonathan M. }, citeulike-article-id = {2740566}, editor = {Luper, S. }, journal = {The Skeptics}, keywords = {folk\_epistemology}, pages = {227--247}, posted-at = {2008-06-03 18:14:19}, priority = {2}, publisher = {Ashgate Publishing}, title = {Metaskepticism: Meditations in Ethno-Epistemology}, year = {2003} }

TY - CHAP ID - nichols03 L3 - citeulike-article-id:2740566 TI - Metaskepticism: Meditations in Ethno-Epistemology JF - The Skeptics SP - 227 EP - 247 PB - Ashgate Publishing N2 - Throughout the 20th century , an enormous amount of intellectual fuel was spent debating the merits of a class of skeptical arguments which purport to show that knowledge of the external world is not possible. These arguments , whose origins can be traced back to Descartes , played an important role in the work of some of the leading philosophers of the 20th century , including Russell , Moore and Wittgenstein , and they continue to engage the interest of contemporary philosophers. (e.g. , Cohen 1999 , DeRose 1995 , Hill 1996 , Klein 1981 , Lewis 1996 , McGinn 1993 , Nozick 1981 , Schiffer 1996 , Unger 1975 , Williams 1996) Typically , these arguments make use of one or more premises which the philosophers proposing them take to be intuitively obvious. Beyond an appeal to intuition , little or no defense is offered , and in many cases it is hard to see what else could be said in support of these premises. A number of authors have suggested that the intuitions undergirding these skeptical arguments are universal – shared by everyone (or almost everyone) who thinks reflectively about knowledge. In this paper we will offer some evidence indicating that they are far from universal. Rather , the evidence suggests that many of the intuitions epistemologists invoke vary with the cultural background , socio-economic status and educational background of the person offering the intuition. And this , we will argue , is bad news for the skeptical arguments that rely on those intuitions. The evidence may also be bad news for skepticism itself – not because it shows that skepticism is false , but rather because , if we accept one prominent account of the link between epistemic intuitions and epistemic concepts , it indicates that skepticism may be much less interesting and much less worrisome than philosophers have taken it to be. KW - folk_epistemology AU - Nichols, Shaun AU - Stich, Stephen AU - Weinberg, Jonathan A2 - Luper, S PY - 2003/// ER -