Deep thoughts and shallow frames: on the susceptibility to framing effects

@article{leboeuf.shafir.2003, abstract = {This paper examines the occurrence of framing effects when more thought is given to problems. In Study 1, participants were presented with one of two frames of several decision problems. Participants' Need for Cognition (NC) scores were obtained, and half the participants were asked to justify their choices. Substantial framing effects were observed, but the amount of thought purportedly given to a problem, whether manipulated by justification elicitation or measured by NC scores, did not reduce the incidence of framing effects. In Study 2, participants responded to both frames of problems in a within-subjects design. Again, NC scores were unrelated to responses on the first frame encountered. However, high-NC, compared to low-NC, participants were more consistent across frames of a problem. More thought, as indexed here, does not reduce the proclivity to be framed, but does promote adherence to normative principles when the applicability of those principles is detectable. Copyright {\copyright} 2003 John Wiley \& Sons, Ltd.}, address = {University of Florida, USA; Princeton University, USA}, author = {Leboeuf, Robyn A. and Shafir, Eldar }, citeulike-article-id = {1379153}, doi = {10.1002/bdm.433}, journal = {Journal of Behavioral Decision Making}, keywords = {decision-making, decisions, framing, prospect-theory, psychology}, number = {2}, pages = {77--92}, posted-at = {2007-06-11 19:31:50}, priority = {3}, title = {Deep thoughts and shallow frames: on the susceptibility to framing effects}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bdm.433}, volume = {16}, year = {2003} }

TY - JOUR ID - leboeuf.shafir.2003 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1379153 TI - Deep thoughts and shallow frames: on the susceptibility to framing effects JF - Journal of Behavioral Decision Making VL - 16 IS - 2 SP - 77 EP - 92 AD - University of Florida, USA; Princeton University, USA N2 - This paper examines the occurrence of framing effects when more thought is given to problems. In Study 1, participants were presented with one of two frames of several decision problems. Participants' Need for Cognition (NC) scores were obtained, and half the participants were asked to justify their choices. Substantial framing effects were observed, but the amount of thought purportedly given to a problem, whether manipulated by justification elicitation or measured by NC scores, did not reduce the incidence of framing effects. In Study 2, participants responded to both frames of problems in a within-subjects design. Again, NC scores were unrelated to responses on the first frame encountered. However, high-NC, compared to low-NC, participants were more consistent across frames of a problem. More thought, as indexed here, does not reduce the proclivity to be framed, but does promote adherence to normative principles when the applicability of those principles is detectable. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. KW - decision-making KW - decisions KW - framing KW - prospect-theory KW - psychology AU - Leboeuf, Robyn AU - Shafir, Eldar PY - 2003/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bdm.433 ER -