Cheap talk when interests conflict

@article{citeulike:1458481, abstract = {Most evolutionary analyses of animal communication suggest that low-cost signals can evolve only when both the signaller and the recipient rank outcomes in the same order. When there is a conflict of interest between sender and receiver, honest signals must be costly. However, recent work suggests that low-cost signals can be evolutionarily stable, even when the sender and the receiver rank outcomes in different orders, as long as the interest in achieving coordination is sufficiently great. In this paper, we extend this body of work by analysing a game theory model that shows that low-cost signals can evolve when there are conflicts of interest and no interest in coordination, as long as individuals interact repeatedly. We also present an empirical example indicating that female rhesus macaques, Macaca mulatta, use honest, low-cost, vocal signals to facilitate interactions when conflicts of interest exist. Copyright 2000 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour}, author = {Silk, Joan B. and Kaldor, Elizabeth and Boyd, Robert }, citeulike-article-id = {1458481}, comment = {abst * SignallerとRecipientの利得が同等であるときコストの低いシグナルが進化すると，ほとんどの動物コミュニケーションの進化的解析は支持する． 送信者，受信者間の興味に衝突があるとき，正直なシグナルは高くつかなければならない． しかし，近年の研究は，送信者と受信者が異なった結果を望むときでさえ，調整を実行することにおける興味が十分に大きければ，低いコストのシグナルは進化的安定になりうることを支持する． 本論文では，我々はゲーム理論モデルの解析（相互作用が繰り返し行われれば，それは低コストのシグナルが，衝突があるとき，調整に興味がないときに進化しうることを示す）によるこの仕事の主部を拡張する． 我々は実証例も示す． それはメスのrhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) は正直で低コストの声のシグナルである． それは興味の衝突が存在するとき，相互作用を促進する． ---=note-separator=--- PDF: http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/faculty/boyd/KaldorEtAl.pdf}, journal = {Animal Behaviour}, keywords = {empirical\_data, evolutionary\_dynamics, signaling}, month = {February}, pages = {423--432}, posted-at = {2007-07-16 09:19:41}, priority = {3}, title = {Cheap talk when interests conflict}, url = {http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/ar/2000/00000059/00000002/art01312}, volume = {59}, year = {2000} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:1458481 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1458481 N2 - Most evolutionary analyses of animal communication suggest that low-cost signals can evolve only when both the signaller and the recipient rank outcomes in the same order. When there is a conflict of interest between sender and receiver, honest signals must be costly. However, recent work suggests that low-cost signals can be evolutionarily stable, even when the sender and the receiver rank outcomes in different orders, as long as the interest in achieving coordination is sufficiently great. In this paper, we extend this body of work by analysing a game theory model that shows that low-cost signals can evolve when there are conflicts of interest and no interest in coordination, as long as individuals interact repeatedly. We also present an empirical example indicating that female rhesus macaques, Macaca mulatta, use honest, low-cost, vocal signals to facilitate interactions when conflicts of interest exist. Copyright 2000 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour JF - Animal Behaviour EP - 432 TI - Cheap talk when interests conflict VL - 59 SP - 423 KW - empirical_data KW - evolutionary_dynamics KW - signaling N1 - abst * SignallerとRecipientの利得が同等であるときコストの低いシグナルが進化すると，ほとんどの動物コミュニケーションの進化的解析は支持する． 送信者，受信者間の興味に衝突があるとき，正直なシグナルは高くつかなければならない． しかし，近年の研究は，送信者と受信者が異なった結果を望むときでさえ，調整を実行することにおける興味が十分に大きければ，低いコストのシグナルは進化的安定になりうることを支持する． 本論文では，我々はゲーム理論モデルの解析（相互作用が繰り返し行われれば，それは低コストのシグナルが，衝突があるとき，調整に興味がないときに進化しうることを示す）によるこの仕事の主部を拡張する． 我々は実証例も示す． それはメスのrhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) は正直で低コストの声のシグナルである． それは興味の衝突が存在するとき，相互作用を促進する． N1 - PDF: http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/faculty/boyd/KaldorEtAl.pdf AU - Silk, Joan AU - Kaldor, Elizabeth AU - Boyd, Robert PY - 2000/02// UR - http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/ar/2000/00000059/00000002/art01312 ER -