Domain-specificity and theory of mind: evaluating neuropsychological evidence

by: Ian A Apperly, Dana Samson, Glyn W Humphreys

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 9, No. 12. (December 2005), pp. 572-577.

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Abstract

Humans' unique aptitude for reasoning about mental states, known as Theory of Mind (ToM), can help explain the unique character of human communication and social interaction. ToM has been studied extensively in children, but there is no clear account of the cognitive basis of ToM in adults. Evidence from functional imaging and neuropsychology is beginning to address this surprising gap in our understanding, and this evidence is often thought to favour a domain-specific or modular architecture for ToM. We present a systematic approach to this issue for the paradigmatic case of belief reasoning, and argue that neuropsychological data provide no clear evidence for domain-specificity or modularity. Progress in understanding ToM requires new tasks that isolate potentially distinct components of this complex ability.

@article{citeulike:408282, abstract = {Humans' unique aptitude for reasoning about mental states, known as Theory of Mind (ToM), can help explain the unique character of human communication and social interaction. ToM has been studied extensively in children, but there is no clear account of the cognitive basis of ToM in adults. Evidence from functional imaging and neuropsychology is beginning to address this surprising gap in our understanding, and this evidence is often thought to favour a domain-specific or modular architecture for ToM. We present a systematic approach to this issue for the paradigmatic case of belief reasoning, and argue that neuropsychological data provide no clear evidence for domain-specificity or modularity. Progress in understanding ToM requires new tasks that isolate potentially distinct components of this complex ability.}, author = {Apperly, Ian A. and Samson, Dana and Humphreys, Glyn W. }, citeulike-article-id = {408282}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2005.10.004}, journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences}, keywords = {domain-specifity, neuropsychology, neuroscience, theory-of-mind, tom}, month = {December}, number = {12}, pages = {572--577}, posted-at = {2005-11-25 13:03:35}, priority = {2}, title = {Domain-specificity and theory of mind: evaluating neuropsychological evidence}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2005.10.004}, volume = {9}, year = {2005} }

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TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:408282 L3 - citeulike-article-id:408282 TI - Domain-specificity and theory of mind: evaluating neuropsychological evidence JF - Trends in Cognitive Sciences VL - 9 IS - 12 SP - 572 EP - 577 N2 - Humans' unique aptitude for reasoning about mental states, known as Theory of Mind (ToM), can help explain the unique character of human communication and social interaction. ToM has been studied extensively in children, but there is no clear account of the cognitive basis of ToM in adults. Evidence from functional imaging and neuropsychology is beginning to address this surprising gap in our understanding, and this evidence is often thought to favour a domain-specific or modular architecture for ToM. We present a systematic approach to this issue for the paradigmatic case of belief reasoning, and argue that neuropsychological data provide no clear evidence for domain-specificity or modularity. Progress in understanding ToM requires new tasks that isolate potentially distinct components of this complex ability. KW - domain-specifity KW - neuropsychology KW - neuroscience KW - theory-of-mind KW - tom AU - Apperly, Ian AU - Samson, Dana AU - Humphreys, Glyn PY - 2005/12// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2005.10.004 ER -

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