Bounded rationality, ambiguity, and the engineering of choice

by: James G March

The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 9, No. 2. (1978), pp. 587-608.

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Abstract

Rational choice involves two guesses, a guess about uncertain future consequences and a guess about uncertain future preferences. Partly as a result of behavioral studies of choice over a twenty-year period, modifications in the way the theory deals with the first guess have become organized into conceptions of bounded rationality. Recently behavioral studies of choice have examined the second guess, the way preferences are processed in choice behavior. These studies suggest possible modifications in standard assumptions about taste and their role in choice. This paper examines some of those modifications, some possible approaches to working on them, and some complications.

@article{citeulike:581043, abstract = {Rational choice involves two guesses, a guess about uncertain future consequences and a guess about uncertain future preferences. Partly as a result of behavioral studies of choice over a twenty-year period, modifications in the way the theory deals with the first guess have become organized into conceptions of bounded rationality. Recently behavioral studies of choice have examined the second guess, the way preferences are processed in choice behavior. These studies suggest possible modifications in standard assumptions about taste and their role in choice. This paper examines some of those modifications, some possible approaches to working on them, and some complications.}, author = {March, James G. }, citeulike-article-id = {581043}, journal = {The Bell Journal of Economics}, keywords = {ambiguity, bounded-rationality, decision-analysis, foundations-jdm, preferences, rationality, tastes}, number = {2}, pages = {587--608}, posted-at = {2006-04-10 10:37:46}, priority = {0}, title = {Bounded rationality, ambiguity, and the engineering of choice}, volume = {9}, year = {1978} }

RIS record

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:581043 L3 - citeulike-article-id:581043 TI - Bounded rationality, ambiguity, and the engineering of choice JF - The Bell Journal of Economics VL - 9 IS - 2 SP - 587 EP - 608 N2 - Rational choice involves two guesses, a guess about uncertain future consequences and a guess about uncertain future preferences. Partly as a result of behavioral studies of choice over a twenty-year period, modifications in the way the theory deals with the first guess have become organized into conceptions of bounded rationality. Recently behavioral studies of choice have examined the second guess, the way preferences are processed in choice behavior. These studies suggest possible modifications in standard assumptions about taste and their role in choice. This paper examines some of those modifications, some possible approaches to working on them, and some complications. KW - ambiguity KW - bounded-rationality KW - decision-analysis KW - foundations-jdm KW - preferences KW - rationality KW - tastes AU - March, James PY - 1978/// ER -

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