Strategic Similarity and Emergent Conventions: Evidence from Similar Stag Hunt Games

by: Frederick W Rankin, John B Van Huyck, Raymond C Battalio

Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 32, No. 2. (August 2000), pp. 315-337.

View FullText article

DOI, ScienceDirect

Reviews [Write a review of this article]

There are no reviews of this article

Find related articles from these CiteULike users

voiklis, ColDyn (group), 801 (group)

Find related articles with these CiteULike tags

_d_core-references, empirical, games, game-theory

Abstract

This paper reports evidence on the origin of convention in laboratory cohorts confronting similar but not identical strategic situations repeatedly. The experiment preserves the action space of the game, while randomly perturbing the payoffs and scrambling the action labels in an effort to blunt the salience of retrospective selection principles. Hence, the similarity between stage games is reduced to certain strategic details, like efficiency, security, and risk dominance. Nevertheless, we do observe conventions emerging in half of the laboratory cohorts. When a convention emerges subjects's behavior conforms to the selection principles of efficiency rather than security or risk dominance. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78, C92, D83.

@article{citeulike:1089900, abstract = {This paper reports evidence on the origin of convention in laboratory cohorts confronting similar but not identical strategic situations repeatedly. The experiment preserves the action space of the game, while randomly perturbing the payoffs and scrambling the action labels in an effort to blunt the salience of retrospective selection principles. Hence, the similarity between stage games is reduced to certain strategic details, like efficiency, security, and risk dominance. Nevertheless, we do observe conventions emerging in half of the laboratory cohorts. When a convention emerges subjects's behavior conforms to the selection principles of efficiency rather than security or risk dominance. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78, C92, D83.}, author = {Rankin, Frederick W. and Van Huyck, John B. and Battalio, Raymond C. }, citeulike-article-id = {1089900}, doi = {10.1006/game.1999.0711}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, keywords = {\_d\_core-references, empirical, game-theory}, month = {August}, number = {2}, pages = {315--337}, posted-at = {2007-02-06 03:01:56}, priority = {3}, title = {Strategic Similarity and Emergent Conventions: Evidence from Similar Stag Hunt Games}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0711}, volume = {32}, year = {2000} }

RIS record

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:1089900 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1089900 TI - Strategic Similarity and Emergent Conventions: Evidence from Similar Stag Hunt Games JF - Games and Economic Behavior VL - 32 IS - 2 SP - 315 EP - 337 N2 - This paper reports evidence on the origin of convention in laboratory cohorts confronting similar but not identical strategic situations repeatedly. The experiment preserves the action space of the game, while randomly perturbing the payoffs and scrambling the action labels in an effort to blunt the salience of retrospective selection principles. Hence, the similarity between stage games is reduced to certain strategic details, like efficiency, security, and risk dominance. Nevertheless, we do observe conventions emerging in half of the laboratory cohorts. When a convention emerges subjects's behavior conforms to the selection principles of efficiency rather than security or risk dominance. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78, C92, D83. KW - _d_core-references KW - empirical KW - game-theory AU - Rankin, Frederick AU - Van Huyck, John AU - Battalio, Raymond PY - 2000/08// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0711 ER -

RIS BibTeX